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Abstract. From the 21st to the 26th of October 2007, the Dagstuhl
Seminar 07431 on Computational Issues in Social Choice was held
at the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss
Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their re-
cent research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. The
abstracts of the talks given during the seminar are collected in this pa-
per. The ﬁrst section summarises the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to full papers are provided where available.
Keywords. Computational social choice, voting theory, fair division,
mechanism design, coalition formation, complexity theory, preference
representation, algorithms
07431 Executive Summary  Computational Issues in
Social Choice
Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of study at the interface
of social choice theory and computer science, with knowledge ﬂowing in either
direction. On the one hand, computational social choice is concerned with im-
porting concepts and procedures from social choice theory for solving questions
that arise in computer science and AI application domains. This is typically
the case for managing societies of autonomous agents, which calls for negotia-
tion and voting procedures. On the other hand, computational social choice is
concerned with importing notions and methods from computer science for solv-
ing questions originally stemming from social choice, for instance by providing
new perspectives on the problem of manipulation and control in elections. This
Dagstuhl Seminar has been devoted to the presentation of recent results and an
exchange of ideas in this growing research ﬁeld.
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Selection Games and Deterministic Lotteries
Alon Altman (Stanford University, USA)
The design of deterministic and fair mechanisms for selection among a set of
self-motivated agents based solely on these agents' input is a major challenge
for electronic commerce. These mechanisms are a special case of zero-sum games
where the only possible outcomes are selections of a single agent among the set
of agents. We assume the lack of an external coordinator, and therefore we focus
on mechanisms which have a solution where the agents play weakly dominant
strategies. Our ﬁrst major result shows that dominated strategies could be added
to any selection mechanism, so that the resulting mechanism becomes quasi-
symmetric. For fairness, we require the mechanism to be non-imposing; that is,
the mechanism should allow any agent to be selected in such a solution. We ﬁrst
show that such mechanisms do not exist when there are two or three agents in
the system. However, surprisingly, we show that such mechanisms exist when
there are four or more agents. Moreover, in our second major result, we show
that there exist selection mechanisms that implement any distribution over the
agents, when the agents play mixed dominant strategies.
These results also have signiﬁcance for distributed computing, ranking sys-
tems, and social choice.
Keywords: Mutiagent lottery selection game
Joint work of: Altman, Alon; Tennenholtz, Moshe
Sequential Groves Mechanisms for Public Project
Problems
Krzysztof Apt (CWI  Amsterdam, NL)
It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced
Groves mechanisms exist. This motivated recent research on designing variants of
feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves) payments') that generate reduced deﬁcit.
We ﬁrst show that for public project problems no feasible Groves mechanism
can reduce the deﬁcit inherently present in VCG mechanism.
This brings us to a study of sequential Groves mechanisms. We show that
then other dominant strategies than truth-telling may exist and that in the case
of public project problems they can be used to reduce deﬁcit by simultaneously
minimizing players' payments.
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Weighted Voting Games: Design and Link with Reliability
Theory
Haris Aziz (University of Warwick, GB)
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in
economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and
distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting
weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning
if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a speciﬁed
quota. The Banzhaf index is a measure of voting power of an agent in a weighted
voting game. It depends on the number of coalitions in which the agent is the
diﬀerence in the coalition winning or losing. We examine voting power theory
and weighted voting games from a computational point of view. It is pointed
out how weighted voting games and simple games provide a link between social
choice theory and reliability theory. An eﬃcient algorithm for designing weighted
voting games is then presented.
Keywords: Weighted voting games, computational social choice, voting power,
Banzhaf index, reliability theory, distributed systems and algorithms
Joint work of: Aziz, Haris; Paterson, Mike; Leech, Dennis
Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and
Young Elections
Nadja Betzler (Universität Jena, D)
We show that, other than for standard complexity theory, the computational
(in)tractability of the classic Dodgson and Young election systems behaves very
diﬀerently from a parameterized complexity point of view. That is, on the one
hand, we present an eﬃcient ﬁxed-parameter algorithm for determining a Con-
dorcet winner in Dodgson elections by a minimum number of switches in the
votes. On the other hand, we prove that the corresponding problem for Young
elections, where one has to delete votes instead of performing switches, is W[2]-
complete. In addition, we study Dodgson elections that allow ties between the
candidates and give ﬁxed-parameter tractability as well as W[2]-hardness results
depending on the cost model for switching ties.
Keywords: Fixed-parameter tractability, W[2]-completeness, voting/election
systems
Joint work of: Betzler, Nadja; Guo, Jiong; Niedermeier, Rolf
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Eﬃciency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible
Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity
Sylvain Bouveret (ONERA  Toulouse, F)
We consider the problem of allocating fairly a set of indivisible goods among
agents from the point of view of compact representation and computational
complexity. We start by assuming that agents have dichotomous preferences ex-
pressed by propositional formulae. We express eﬃciency and envy-freeness in a
logical setting, which reveals unexpected connections to nonmonotonic reason-
ing. Then we identify the complexity of determining whether there exists an
eﬃcient and envy-free allocation, for several notions of eﬃciency, when prefer-
ences are represented in a succinct way (as well as restrictions of this problem).
We ﬁrst study the problem under the assumption that preferences are dichoto-
mous, and then in the general case.
Keywords: Fair division, complexity, envy-freeness, compact representation,
preferences
Joint work of: Bouveret, Sylvain; Lang, Jérôme
Full Paper:
http://www.ijcai.org/papers/0656.pdf
Bibliography: Bouveret, Sylvain and Lang, Jérôme (2005). Eﬃciency and envy-
freeness in fair division of indivisible good: logical representation and complexity.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI'05).
The Computational Complexity of Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt (LMU München, D)
Various problems in the mathematical social sciences can be tackled by ﬁnd-
ing the most desirable elements of a set given some binary relation. Examples
can be found in areas as diverse as social choice theory, game theory, and ar-
gumentation theory. We review the computational complexity of a number of
solution conceptsso-called tournament solutionsranging from von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets to the Banks set. Some particularly attractive solution
concepts are deﬁned in terms of a covering relationa transitive subrelation
of the original relation. We consider three diﬀerent types of covering (upward,
downward, and bidirectional) and the corresponding solution concepts known as
the uncovered set and the minimal covering set. We present the ﬁrst polynomial-
time algorithm for ﬁnding the minimal bidirectional covering set (an acknowl-
edged open problem) and prove that deciding whether an alternative is in a
minimal upward or downward covering set is NP-hard. Furthermore, we obtain
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various set-theoretical inclusions, which reveal a strong connection between von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets and upward covering on the one hand, and
the Banks set and downward covering on the other hand. In particular, we show
that every stable set is also a minimal upward covering set.
Keywords: Social choice theory, minimal covering set, dominance graphs, Con-
dorcet
Joint work of: Brandt, Felix; Fischer, Felix
Bibliography: F. Brandt and F. Fischer. Computational aspects of covering in
dominance graphs. In R.C. Holte and A. Howe (eds.), Proc. 22nd Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI'07), pp. 694699. AAAI Press, 2007.
False-Name-Proofness in Social Choice, and Limited
Veriﬁcation of Identities
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, USA)
A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent can beneﬁt from using multiple
identiﬁers (e.g., e-mail addresses). We show that the best false-name-proof voting
rule satisfying participation is to draw two alternatives at random; if all votes
prefer the same one, choose that one, otherwise ﬂip a coin. To address this and
other impossibility results, we show how to verify the identities of some agents so
that the mechanism and the veriﬁcation protocol together are false-name-proof.
Keywords: Voting, social choice, false-name-proofness, identity veriﬁcation
The Use of Ultraﬁlters in Judgment Aggregation
Daniel Eckert (Universität Graz, A)
Although ultraﬁlters have long been used in the proof of Arrow's theorem, this
proof technique has not been widely exploited in the recent literature on judg-
ment aggregation. This is all the more astonishing as the formulation of the
properties of judgment aggregation rules in terms of the collections of decisive
sets of individuals almost directly translates into properties of collections which
are known as simple games and which have been shown to be closely related to
ultraﬁlters. We prove an important impossibility theorem of Nehring and Puppe
by showing that any collection of decisive sets of individuals for a monotonic
and independent judgment aggregation rule which satisﬁes universal domain,
surjectivity and collective rationality for a strongly connected (totally blocked)
agenda of propositions is an ultraﬁlter, which, in the case of a ﬁnite number of
individuals, is well known to be equivalent to a dictatorship.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, ultraﬁlters, simple games
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Computational Complexity of Weighted Voting Games
Edith Elkind (University of Southampton, GB)
Weighted voting games are coalitional games in which each player has a weight
(intuitively corresponding to its voting power), and a coalition is successful if
the sum of its weights exceeds a given threshold. Key questions in coalitional
games include ﬁnding coalitions that are stable (in the sense that no member
of the coalition has any rational incentive to leave it), and ﬁnding a division of
payoﬀs to coalition members (an imputation) that is fair.
We investigate the computational complexity of such questions for weighted
voting games. We study the core, the least core, and the nucleolus, distinguishing
those problems that are polynomial-time computable from those that are NP-
hard, and providing pseudopolynomial and approximation algorithms for the
NP-hard problems.
Keywords: Weighted voting, core, least core, nucleolus




Bibliography: E. Elkind, L.A. Goldberg, P. Goldberg, and M. Wooldridge. Com-
putational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games. In Twenty-Second Con-
ference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-07), Vancouver, Canada, July 2007.
Manipulation in Approval Voting
Ulle Endriss (University of Amsterdam, NL)
In approval voting each voter can approve of as many candidates as they wish.
The candidate receiving the most approvals wins. A ballot is considered sincere
if the voter prefers any of the approved candidates over any of the disapproved
candidates. We show that there are several interesting scenarios in approval
voting in which no voter has an incentive to vote by means of an insincere ballot.
This is possible (and does not contradict the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem)
because in approval voting there are multiple ways of voting sincerely for any
given preference ordering. For instance, one of our results states that, if ties
are broken using a uniform probability distribution and if voters are expected-
utility maximisers, then they never have an incentive to manipulate the election
by voting insincerely. The approach taken is, at least partly, computational in
the sense that some of the results have been derived with the help of a computer.
An early version of this paper has appeared in the proceedings of TARK-2007.
Keywords: Voting, manipulation
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Full Paper:
http://www.illc.uva.nl/∼ulle/pubs/ﬁles/EndrissTARK2007.pdf
Bibliography: U. Endriss. Vote Manipulation in the Presence of Multiple Sin-
cere Ballots. In D. Samet (ed.), Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoret-
ical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2007), pp. 125134, Presses
Universitaires de Louvain, June 2007.
Distributed Algorithms for Social Choice
Boi Faltings (EPFL, CH)
We consider social choice problems consisting of interrelated sets of variables
controlled by diﬀerent agents.
Distributed algorithms are desirable for three reasons. First, agents can set
their variables to reasonable values even if optimization is incomplete, thus im-
proving the reliability of the process. Second, agents do not need to formalize
their preferences for variables they control, thus avoiding potentially huge eﬀorts
of preference elicitation. Third, agents can maintain privacy of many aspects of
their preferences.
I describe distributed optimization algorithms and how they can be extended
to satisfy incentive compatibility and privacy requirements in social choice.
Keywords: Constraint optimization, constraint satisfaction
Dominance in Social Choice and Coalitional Game Theory
Paul Harrenstein (LMU München, D)
We consider dominance relations for social choice as based on the pairwise ma-
jority rule on the one hand and cooperative games with non-transferable utility
(coalitional NTU games) on the other. As these dominance relations may fail to
be transitive and even contain cycles, the notion of maximality becomes unten-
able as an analytical tool. Both in social choice theory and cooperative game the-
ory, a number of concepts have been proposed to take over the role of maximality
in the absence of transitivity. In 1953 McGarvey showed that any irreﬂexive and
anti-symmetric relation can be obtained by the majority rule. In this paper, we
address the analogous issue for ﬁnite NTU games. We ﬁnd any irreﬂexive rela-
tion over a ﬁnite set can be obtained as the dominance relation of some ordinary,
monotonic, and simple NTU coalitional game. We also show that any dominance
relation can be induced by a non-cooperative game via beta-eﬀectivity. Further-
more, we obtain a partial result for the case in which alpha-eﬀectivity is used
and consider the formal interrelationships between Smith sets, Schwartz sets,
stable sets and the core in ﬁnite NTU games.
Keywords: Dominance solutions, coalitional game theory, NTU, social choice
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Joint work of: Harrenstein, Paul; Brandt, Felix
Llull and Copeland Voting Broadly Resist Bribery and
Control
Edith Hemaspaandra (Rochester Institute of Technology, USA)
Control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as ad-
dition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate
wins. An election system in which such an agent's computational task is NP-
hard is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Among election systems
with polynomial-time winner determination problems, the only election systems
known to be resistant to all the standard control types are highly artiﬁcial elec-
tion systems created by hybridization. We prove that an election system devel-
oped by the 13th century mystic Ramon Llull, the well-studied Copeland election
system, and generalizations of Copeland's system are all resistant to the stan-
dard types of (constructive) electoral control. This is the most comprehensive
resistance to control yet achieved by any natural election system. In addition,
we show that Llull, Copeland, and the Copeland generalizations are broadly
resistant to bribery and manipulation attacks, and we integrate the potential
irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results.
Keywords: Computational social choice, bribery, Copeland elections, control,
voting, manipulation
Joint work of: Faliszewski, Piotr; Hemaspaandra, Edith; Hemaspaandra, Lane;
Rothe, Jörg; Schnoor, Henning
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.rochester.edu/trs/theory-trs.html
Bibliography: P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe.
Llull and Copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control. Proceedings of the
22nd AAAI Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI 2007), AAAI Press,
pp. 724730, July 2007.
P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe. Copeland
voting fully resists constructive control. URCS TR 923, October 2007.
P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and H. Schnoor. Copeland voting: Ties
matter. URCS TR 926, November 2007.
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Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains
Jérôme Lang (IRIT  Toulouse, F)
In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a
Cartesian product of ﬁnite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or
issues). Dealing with such domains leads to the following well-known dilemma:
either ask the voters to vote separately on each issue, which may lead to so-called
multiple election paradoxes as soon as voters' preferences are not separable; or
allow voters to express their full preferences on the set of all combinations of
values, which is practically impossible as soon as the number of issues and/or
the size of the domains are more than a few units. We try to reconciliate both
views and ﬁnd a middle way, by relaxing the extremely demanding separabil-
ity restriction into this much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order
x1 > . . . > xp on the set of issues such that for each voter, every issue xi is
preferentially independent of xi+1, . . . ,xp given x1, . . . ,xi−1. This leads us to
deﬁne a family of sequential voting rules, deﬁned as the sequential composition
of local voting rules. These rules relate to the setting of conditional preference
networks (CP-nets) recently developed in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature.
Lastly, we study in detail how these sequential rules inherit, or do not inherit,
the properties of their local components.
Keywords: Voting, combinatorial domains, multiple elections, preferential in-
dependence, CP-nets
Joint work of: Lang, Jérôme; Xia, Lirong
Representing Interval Orders by Weighted Bases: Some
Complexity Results
Pierre Marquis (Université d'Artois  Lens, F)
This work is centered on the notion of interval order as a model for preferences.
We introduce a family of representation languages for such orders, parameterized
by a scale and an aggregation function. We show how interval orders can be
represented by elements of those languages, called weighted bases. We identify
the complexity of the main decision problems to be considered for exploiting
such representations of interval orders (including the comparison problems and
the non-dominance problem). We also show that the representation of interval
orders based on weighted bases encompasses the penalty-based representation of
complete preorders as a speciﬁc case.
Keywords: Compact representation of preferences, Preferences over combina-
torial domains, Computational complexity
Joint work of: Marquis, Pierre; Öztürk, Meltem
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Topological Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation
Problems
Nicolas Maudet (Université Paris-Dauphine, F)
Resource allocation is a typical social choice problem which consists in allocat-
ing (optimally) a set of resources to a number of agents. We present recent
results and discuss issues pertaining to the topological structure of negotia-
tion/communication graphs, when allocations are iteratively and locally negoti-
ated by autonomous agents, in a truly distributed manner.




Bibliography: Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, and Nicolas Maudet. Allocating
Goods on a Graph to Eliminate Envy. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Con-
ference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AAAI-2007), pp. 700705, AAAI Press, July
2007.
Determining Winners in Weighted and Unweighted
Sequential Majority Voting
Maria Silvia Pini (Università di Padova, I)
In weighted sequential majority voting, preferences are aggregated by a sequence
of pairwise comparisons (also called an agenda) between candidates. The result
of each comparison is determined by a weighted majority vote among the agents.
In this paper we consider the situation where the agents may not have revealed
all their preferences. This is common in many real-life settings, due to privacy
issues or an ongoing elicitation process. We study the computational complexity
of determining the winner(s), given that some preferences may not be revealed
and/or the agenda is not decided. We show that it is easy to determine if a can-
didate wins whatever the agenda. On the other hand, it is hard to know whether
a candidate wins in at least one agenda for at least one completion of the agents'
preferences. This is also true if the agenda can be represented by a balanced tree.
The computational complexity of determining if the candidates win in at least
one (balanced) agenda, for every completion of the agents' preferences remains
an open question. We also consider the case of ﬁxed agendas, and we show that
in this case it is easy to determine if a candidate wins in the ﬁxed agenda for at
least a completion, or for every completion of the agents' preferences.
Keywords: Sequential majority voting, multiagent systems, uncertainty
Joint work of: Pini, Maria Silvia; Rossi, Francesca; Venable, Kristen Brent;
Walsh, Toby
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Algorithms for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem
Ariel D. Procaccia (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is
known to be hard in a variety of voting rules. We put forward eﬃcient algorithms
for the problem in Scoring rules, Maximin and Plurality with runoﬀ, and analyze
their windows of error. Speciﬁcally, given an instance on which an algorithm
fails, we bound the additional power the manipulators need in order to succeed.
We ﬁnally discuss the implications of our results with respect to the popular
approach of employing computational hardness to preclude manipulation.
Keywords: Voting, Coalitional manipulation, Complexity
Joint work of: Zuckerman, Michael; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Rosenschein, Jeﬀrey S.
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/∼arielpro/papers/acmp.soda.pdf
Bibliography: Ofer Dekel, Felix A. Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Incentive
Compatible Regression Learning. Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA-08), San Francisco, California, Jan-
uary 2008 (to appear).
Using Graphical Utility Models for Multi-Issue Bargaining
and Preference Elicitation
Valentin Robu (CWI  Amsterdam, NL)
The ﬁrst part of the talk will cover our work on using utility graphs for modeling
bilateral negotiations between agents with k-additive utility functions. Multi-
issue negotiation with non-linear utilities represents a considerably more chal-
lenging problem than the widely studied case of linearly additive utilities, since
potentially complex complementarity/subtitutability dependencies between is-
sues must be taken into account. We show, through algorithmic analysis and
experimental evaluation, that our proposed graphical utility formalism enables
agents to reach agreements that are close to Pareto-eﬃciency, with a limited
number of negotiation steps.
We apply the proposed negotiation model to the e-commerce domain, in
which agents bargain about the contents of bundles of items, where the utility
functions of the buyers can be represented in k-additive form. In this setting,
we complement our negotiation algorithm with a method to approximate the
initial, starting structure of buyer utility graph, based on anonymous negotiation
data. The construction of the maximal graph structure is based on techniques
inspired from item-based collaborative ﬁltering, used in online recommendation
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algorithms. We show that this combined method enables electronic agents to
achieve fast agreements in complex negotiations, by focusing the search on the
most promising region of the high-dimensional utility space. (joint work with
Koye Somefun, Han La Poutré)
The second part of the talk brieﬂy covers the use of collaborative ﬁltering
techniques (initially developed by us in the above context of multi-issue negotia-
tion) to construct tag correlation graphs using empirical data, in a collaborative
tagging application (joint work with Harry Halpin, Edinburgh and Hana Shep-
herd, Princeton). Finally, we will discuss, very brieﬂy, some ideas for ongoing
work regarding the application of graphical utility models to preference elicita-
tion in k-additive domains.
Keywords: Negotiation, bargaining, multi-issue negotiation, k-additive utilities,
utility graphs, collaborative ﬁltering, multi-agent systems, intelligent agents
Bibliography: V. Robu, D.J.A. Somefun, and J.A. La Poutré. Modeling complex
multi-issue negotiations using utility graphs. In Proc. of the 4th Int. Conf. on
Autonomous Agents & Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS'05), Utrecht, ACM Press,
2005.
V. Robu and J.A. La Poutré. Retrieving the structure of utility graphs used
in multi-item negotiation through collaborative ﬁltering of aggregate buyer pref-
erences. In 2nd Int. Workshop on Rational, Robust and Secure Negotiations in
Multi-Agent Systems. (RRS'06), Hakodate, Japan. Studies in Computational In-
telligence. Springer-Verlag, to appear, 2008.
H. Halpin, V. Robu, H. Shepherd. The Complex Dynamics of Collaborative
Tagging. Proceedings of the 16th Int. World Wide Web Conference (WWW'07),
Banﬀ, Canada, ACM Press, 2007.
Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying
Jörg Rothe (Universität Düsseldorf, D)
We discuss issues regarding benign algorithms, frequency of hardness, and ap-
proximation of a voting-related problem.
Keywords: Optimal weighted lobbying; approximation; greedy algorithm




Bibliography: Gábor Erdélyi, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe, Holger Spakowski:
On Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying, and Frequency of Correctness
Versus Average-Case Polynomial Time. FCT 2007, pp. 300311.
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Clearing Algorithms for Barter Exchange Markets:
Enabling Nationwide Kidney Exchanges
Tuomas Sandholm (CMU  Pittsburgh, USA)
In barter-exchange markets, agents seek to swap their items with one another,
in order to improve their own utilities. These swaps consist of cycles of agents,
with each agent receiving the item of the next agent in the cycle. We focus
mainly on the upcoming national kidney-exchange market, where patients with
kidney disease can obtain compatible donors by swapping their own willing but
incompatible donors. With over 70,000 patients already waiting for a cadaver
kidney in the US, this market is seen as the only ethical way to signiﬁcantly
reduce the 4,000 deaths per year attributed to kidney disease.
The clearing problem involves ﬁnding a social welfare maximizing exchange
when the maximum length of a cycle is ﬁxed. Long cycles are forbidden, since, for
incentive reasons, all transplants in a cycle must be performed simultaneously.
Also, in barter-exchanges generally, more agents are aﬀected if one drops out of a
longer cycle. We prove that the clearing problem with this cycle-length constraint
is NP-hard. Solving it exactly is one of the main challenges in establishing a
national kidney exchange.
We present the ﬁrst algorithm capable of clearing these markets on a na-
tionwide scale. The key is incremental problem formulation. We adapt two par-
adigms for the task: constraint generation and column generation. For each, we
develop techniques that dramatically improve both runtime and memory usage.
We conclude that column generation scales drastically better than constraint
generation. Our algorithm also supports several generalizations, as demanded
by real-world kidney exchanges.
Our algorithm replaced CPLEX as the clearing algorithm of the Alliance
for Paired Donation, one of the leading kidney exchanges. The match runs are
conducted every two weeks and transplants based on our optimizations have
already been conducted.
Keywords: Matching market, exchange, clearing algorithm, winner determina-
tion, computational complexity
Joint work of: Abraham, David; Blum, Avrim; Sandholm, Tuomas
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼sandholm/kidneyExchange.EC07.withGrantInfo.pdf
Bibliography: David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm. Clearing
algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges.
In J. MacKie-Mason, D. Parkes, and P. Resnick (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California,
USA, June 1115, 2007.
14 U. Endriss, J. Lang, F. Rossi and T. Sandholm
Proportional Representation and Strategic Voters
Arkadii Slinko (University of Auckland, NZ)
The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other
than those created by rounding, faced by voters in the systems of proportional
representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour.
The ﬁrst model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of
seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximiser) while the second considers
a voter who is concerned with the distribution of power in it (power maximiser).
We show that under pure PR seat maximisers do not have any incentives to
manipulate, which justiﬁes the Bowler and Lanoue (1992) claim, and that such
incentives for seat maximisers appear with the introduction of a threshold.
We show that, even in the absence of a threshold, there will always exist
circumstances where a power maximiser would have an incentive to vote insin-
cerely. We demonstrate that her incentives to make an insincere vote depend on
her attitude toward uncertainty. The introduction of a threshold creates new and
stronger opportunities for strategic voters regardless their attitude towards un-
certainty. Finally we discuss the overshooting/undershooting phenomenon, when
either too many or too few like-minded voters attempt to manipulate.
We use two models to explain voters' behaviour at the most recent (2005)
New Zealand general election and demonstrate that rounding creates not only
incentives but also disincentives for strategic voting.
Keywords: Parliament choosing rule, proportional representation, power index,
strategic voting, manipulability, overshooting, undershooting
Joint work of: Slinko, Arkadii; White, Shaun
Full Paper:
http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/publications/12-2006-cah.pdf
On the Link between Social Choice and Multiple Criteria
Decision Analysis
Alexis Tsoukiàs (Université Paris-Dauphine, F)
In this talk I survey the several relations between Social Choice Theory and
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis. I ﬁrst show the conceptual similarities be-
tween the two theories and how these have been developed in the past 30 years
as an alternative to the mainstream multi-attribute value theory. I will also ex-
plore the critical diﬀerences between Social Choice and MCDA with particular
emphasis to concepts such as weights, trade-oﬀs, importance of coalitions and
measures. The talk will also survey more recent results in the literature where the
diﬀerences between preference aggregation procedures are revisited under con-
joint measurement theory (work done by D. Bouyssou and M. Pirlot). Current
research directions will conclude the presentation.
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Bibliography: D. Bouyssou, Th. Marchant, M. Pirlot, A. Tsoukiàs, Ph. Vincke.
Evaluation and Decision Models: Stepping Stones for the Analyst. Springer Ver-
lag, Berlin, 2006.
A Family of Logic-Based Preference Representation
Languages and an Application to Combinatorial Auctions
Joel Uckelman (University of Amsterdam, NL)
Logic-based preference representation langauges can be useful when agent pref-
erences are over combinatorial domainsfor example, possible committees in
committee elections, or bundles of goods in combinatorial auctionssituations
in which it can be challenging simply to convey agent preferences due to the
large number of possible outcomes.
Logic-based languages have a number of appealing properties, among them
that
1. natural syntactic constraints (i.e., on the kinds of propositional formulas
agents are allowed to use) are closely related to properties of utility functions,
and so these languages can be tailored to express particular classes of utility
functions, and
2. the structure of these languages is useful in answering queries about agent
preferences.
In a paper presented at AiPref-2007, Ulle Endriss and I explore the expressive
power, succinctness of representation, and complexity of ﬁnding maximal states
for several logic-based languages. Recent work has involved comparing branch-
and-bound heuristics for the Winner Determination Problem for combinatorial
auctions where bidders use a logic-based language for bidding. Our heurisitcs
attempt to exploit the structure of the language when solving the WDP.
Joint work of: Endriss, Ulle; Uckelman, Joel
Bibliography: J. Uckelman and U. Endriss. Preference Representation with
Weighted Goals: Expressivity, Succinctness, Complexity. Proc. AAAI Workshop
on Preference Handling for Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AiPref-2007).
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Notions of Optimality in CP-nets, Strategic Games and
Soft Constraints
Brent Venable (Università di Padova, I)
The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied mathematics
and computer science concerned with decision making. Here we consider this
notion in the context of three formalisms used for diﬀerent purposes in reason-
ing about multi-agent systems: strategic games, CP-nets, and soft constraints.
To relate the notions of optimality in these formalisms we introduce a natural
qualitative modiﬁcation of the notion of a strategic game.
We show then that the optimal outcomes of a CP-net are exactly the Nash
equilibria of an appropriately deﬁned strategic game. This allows us to use the
techniques of game theory to search for optimal outcomes of CP-nets and vice-
versa, to use techniques developed for CP-nets to search for Nash equilibria of
the considered games. Then, we relate the notion of optimality used in the area
of soft constraints to that used in strategic games, showing that, for a class of
soft constraints that includes weighted constraints, every optimal solution is a
Nash equilibrium. However, the notion that coincides in general with optimality
for soft constraints is that of Pareto eﬃcient joint strategy.
Keywords: Strategic games, pure Nash equilibria, preferences, CP-nets, soft
constraints
Joint work of: Apt, Krzysztof R.; Rossi, Francesca; Venable, Brent
Some Complexity Issues in Preference Elicitation and
Strategic Manipulation
Toby Walsh (University of New South Wales  Sydney, AU)
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding
the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections
aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complex-
ity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that
the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that
it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from
one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents.
We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election
and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate aﬀects the
computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there
are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's
vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their pref-
erences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a ﬁne-grained view
of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between
predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation.
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Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally
diﬃcult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability
distribution over the votes.
Keywords: Preference elicitation, manipulation, computational complexity
Voting with Partial Orders
Lirong Xia (Duke University, USA)
Voters are not always able to to give a complete linear order of the alternatives,
either because they are unable to compare certain alternatives, or because the set
of alternatives is too large. Hence, we study the case where voters submit partial
orders (possibly represented as a CP-net). We show several impossibility results
regarding neutrality and Pareto eﬃciency for such voting rules/correspondences,
and study the complexity of determining whether an alternative will win for
some/any completion of the partial orders, given a standard voting rule.
Keywords: Seat-by-seat voting rule, decomposable voting rule, neutrality,
Pareto eﬃciency, possible winner, necessary winner
Joint work of: Xia, Lirong; Conitzer, Vincent; Lang, Jérôme; Ying, Mingsheng
Voting with the Mean and with the (Spatial) Median:
Decisiveness and Manipulability
William S. Zwicker (Union College  Schenectady, USA)




 Typical grading systems that assign a letter grade for a course based on the
average of several test scores.
Each is a mean proximity rule; each has a representation in which inputs (votes)
are identiﬁed with points in Euclidean space, and the results of the election are
determined by the output point closest (in the Euclidean metric) to the mean
location q of the votes.
We show that the mean proximity rules coincide with the mean polygonal
rules, and with a (highly) generalized class of scoring rules.
The mean aﬃne rules represent a further generalization. We show that the
rational mean aﬃne rules are exactly the voting rules that are consistent and
connected.
This is a sort of generalization of Smith's and Young's results characterizing
scoring rules, but in a broader context, with no use of a neutrality axiom.
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What happens when we substitute for the mean q, in these representations,
the mediancentre (Fermat-Weber point) mc, a multidimensional version of the
median? We obtain a new and rather strange class of voting rules with some
interesting and diﬀerent properties. For example, the McBorda rule is more
resistant to manipulation than the Borda rule, and much more decisive (fewer
ties).
The mediancentre presents us with some computational challenges, particu-
larly when it is located on or near a segment boundary (the election is tied, or
close to tied). I could use some advice on these algorithmic questions, especially
in the case of median rules for many voters, or for more than three alternatives.
Keywords: Mean rule, generalized scoring rule, mean aﬃne rule, Fermat-Weber
point, mediancentre, decisiveness, manipulability
Social Software for Coalition Formation
Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University, NL)
This paper concerns an interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation. We
apply the MacBeth software, relational algebra, the RelVieW tool, graph theory,
bargaining theory, social choice theory, and consensus reaching to a model of
coalition formation. A feasible government is a pair consisting of a coalition of
parties and a policy supported by this coalition. A feasible government is stable
if it is not dominated by any other feasible government. Each party evaluates
each government with respect to certain criteria.
MacBeth helps to quantify the importance of the criteria and the attrac-
tiveness and repulsiveness of governments to parties with respect to the given
criteria. Feasibility, dominance, and stability are formulated in relation-algebraic
terms. The RelVieW tool is used to compute the dominance relation and the set
of all stable governments. In case there is no stable government, i.e., in case the
dominance relation is cyclic, we apply graph-theoretical techniques for breaking
the cycles. If the solution is not unique, we select the ﬁnal government by ap-
plying bargaining or appropriate social choice rules. We describe how a coalition
may form a government by reaching consensus about a policy.
Keywords: Coalition formation, stable government, MacBeth, relational alge-
bra, RelVieW, graph theory
Joint work of: Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Berghammer, Rudolf; Eklund, Patrik;
van der Rijt, Jan-Willem; Roubens, Marc; de Swart, Harrie
Full Paper:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/t6171205q434n006/
Bibliography: Harrie de Swart et al. Social Software for Coalition Formation. In
de Swart et al., Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge
Instruments II. Springer, LNAI 4342, pp. 130.
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Reasoning about Coalitional Games
Wiebe van der Hoek (University of Liverpool, GB)
The area of Logic and Games roughly has two directions: Games for Logic, in
which one for instance tries to give a game-theoretically inspired truth deﬁnition,
or a notion of similarity of models, and Logic for Games, where one takes a
representational, computational and proof-theoretic view on games. The talk will
be an example of the latter branch. Until now, this branch is typically exploited
by Modal Logicians, modeling phenomena in non-cooperative games. In this
talk, we make a ﬁrst step in formalising reasonnig in coalitional, or cooperative
games. We present two logics that facilitate reasoning about such games: the
ﬁrst is expressively complete, whereas the second can deal with inﬁnitely many
outcomes of a coalitional game.
Keywords: Coalitional Games
Joint work of: Ågotnes, Thomas; van der Hoek, Wiebe; Wooldridge, Michael
Full Paper:
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1160659
Bibliography: Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge,
On the Logic of Coalitional Games, In P. Stone and G. Weiss (eds.), Proceedings
of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems, ACM Press, pp. 153160, 2006.
